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PROSELYTISM AND THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM IMPROPER
IRRELIGIOUS INFLUENCE: THE EXAMPLE OF PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION
SA de Freitas
1

Introduction

The words "proselytism" and "proselytise" descend from a Greek word proselutos,
meaning "one who has come to a place" or "one who comes over". Jurisprudentially
speaking, proselytism is a concept within the larger genus of the protection of
religious rights and freedoms, and lends itself to differing opinions.1 There are also
different insights into proselytism emanating from the various traditional religions
and the plethora of denominations within each.2 However, a substantial school of
thinking assumes that proselytism can take place only in a religious context.
Lawrence Uzzell comments: "We live in an age of persuasion, in which we are
bombarded by political and commercial messages designed to change our thoughts
and actions, but the unfavourable term 'proselytism' is reserved for specifically
religious persuaders."3 Uzzell adds that "[s]ecular specialists on human rights and
international law, even those who defend freedom of conscience, now use the word
'proselytism' to mean any attempt by any religious believer to win converts from
other religions or from irreligion".4
The question arises whether improper proselytism is relevant only to "religious forms
of improper influence" and excludes other forms of "improper belief influence". It is
argued in the article that influencing the beliefs of someone improperly can include a
kind of proselytising action pertaining to a belief, which is not only religious by
nature but also of one that is irreligious. In addition to improper "religious"
proselytism, improper proselytism should include an understanding of improper



1
2
3
4

SA de Freitas. BProc LLB LLM (UFS). Associate Professor, Department of Constitutional Law and
Philosophy of Law, University of the Free State. Email: defreitas@ufs.ac.za
Garnett 2005 USTLJ 465-466.
See for example Witte and Martin Sharing the Book.
Uzzell 2004 http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-122989524/don-t-call-it-proselytism.
Uzzell 2004 http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-122989524/don-t-call-it-proselytism.
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"irreligious" proselytism. This article illustrates this understanding by means of the
risks embedded in exclusively irreligious public education and teaching.5
2

The right to freedom of religion, belief and education

From the Universal Declaration of Human Rights6 and the European Convention on

Human Rights7 it is clear that freedom of thought is a basic right of "everyone".
There is no age limit at which people begin to enjoy such a legal right. Young
persons (and therefore pupils) have a right to freedom of thought. This right is
important in the context of school education, where a student's freedom of thought
may be restricted by ideological indoctrination.8 Article 5(1)(b) of the Convention

against Discrimination in Education places the emphasis on the protection of a
person's (or group's) convictions as well as the protection of the liberty of parents to
have their children morally educated in accordance with their convictions.9

5

6

7

8

9

By this it is not implied that there are no public institutions in democratic and plural societies
where religious knowledge is forced upon irreligious recipients. Nonetheless, the focus of this
article is on those public teaching institutions in so-called democratic and plural societies, such as
schools, where irreligious forms of knowledge are forced upon irreligious recipients. Needless to
say, the argument presented in this article will also be of value to instances where religious
knowledge is forced upon an irreligious recipient, or where a religion is forced upon a recipient
loyal to another religion.
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states: "Everyone has the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."
Article 9(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), which states: "Everyone has
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change
his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance." This
reads exactly the same as Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Clarke 1986 ICLQ 271. Neither the Universal Declaration on Human Rights nor the European
Convention on Human Rights explicitly acknowledges the rights of children to freedom of
thought in schools. The UN Declaration (Article 26(3)) provides that "parents have a prior right
to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children". A similar principle
concerning the relative priority of parents' rights, is expressed by Article 2 of the Protocol 1 to
the European Convention on Human Rights (1952) 271. From this it is clear that although the
right to freedom of thought is guaranteed by the European Convention to everyone, the
education initiatives of the state are explicitly limited only by reference to the "religious and
philosophical conviction" of parents.
The Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960), Article 5(1)(b): "The States Parties
to this Convention agree that: (b) It is essential to respect the liberty of parents and, where
applicable, of legal guardians … to ensure in a manner consistent with the procedures followed
in the State for the application of its legislation, the religious and moral education of the children
in conformity with their own convictions; and no person or group of persons should be compelled
to receive religious instruction inconsistent with his or their convictions."

869

SA DE FREITAS

PER / PEJL 2014(17)3

Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Articles 1
and 6 of the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief may be affected by coercion or through
religious persons being subjected to preaching that harm their beliefs.10 The
provisions of Article 19(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
concerning the right to hold opinions without interference include the understanding
that religious persons may not wish to be exposed to any type of indoctrination in
any form.11 Protocol 1 of Article 2 of the European Convention and Article 18(4) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights deal with the liberty of
parents and/or legal guardians to ensure that the religious and moral education of
their children conforms to their own convictions. This should be read in conjunction
with Article 13(3) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.12 Article 51(a) of the UNESCO Convention reaffirms the right of parents or
legal guardians to ensure "the religious and moral education of the children in
conformity with their own convictions, and no person or group of persons should be
compelled to receive religious instruction inconsistent with his or their conviction".13
The issue of religious freedom at public schools is a controversial contemporary
concern. At the annual sessions of the United Nation's Human Rights Council, the
topic of religious instruction within the framework of the fundamental right to
religious freedom is constantly on the agenda for discussion and resolution. The
question regularly asked is if religious instruction should take place at public schools
and, if so, how it should be implemented to do justice to the fundamental right to
religious freedom in a constitutional state.14 Stephen Carter states: "Too many of
today's theorists of liberalism … seem determined to use 'public' education to create
a nation where everybody thinks the same way."15 In this quest towards universal

10

11
12
13
14

15

Lerner 1998 EILR 484. Lerner's referral to "preaching that harms their beliefs" is not sufficiently
nuanced. Here one would rather talk about some form of "coerced preaching" as preaching per
se is not necessarily coerced.
Lerner 1998 EILR 484.
Lerner 1998 EILR 514-515.
Lerner 1998 EILR 539.
Vorster 2010 NGTT 205. Here one needs to be careful in presenting the idea that public schools
are connoted to only that which is irreligious.
Carter 1997 SHLR 1224.
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thinking there are those who take the view that "religious" content should be
removed from teaching at public institutions. This endeavour to remove religion from
teaching at public schools assumes that teaching can be divorced from religion and,
therefore, that such teaching is belief free. In a truly democratic and plural society,
public schools need to accommodate a wide range of cultural and religious
backgrounds, which precludes their organisation in accordance with any thick
concept of the good.16
The positivistic preoccupation in education with "elements of reality alone" or with
the mere accumulation of "empirical facts" obstructs the relevance of these facts in
their relation to human life in its totality.17 Reverence for facts and the acquisition of
scientific knowledge (in an exclusive manner) result in a national system of
education that provides its students with manifold simplistic "answers", but is always
painfully lacking in profound questions.18 This positivism is also similar to humanist
approaches towards education, which support the view that the scientific method is
applicable to all areas of human concern, and is the only valid means for
determining truth.19 In many instances, school authorities, although not setting out
to promote irreligious worldviews, have an underlying worldview of modern
education that divorces humankind from its dependence on religious answers to
many of the ultimate questions of human existence with irreligious answers. In this
regard, irreligious education gives irreligious answers to ultimate questions and
conveys its irreligious understanding of reality essentially as a matter of faith. 20 Just
as there is a risk for a public school to place too much emphasis on a specific
religious component in its teaching, there is the risk of a public school substantially
withdrawing the religious element from its teaching curriculum. This has implications
for how the irreligious dimension of improper proselytism should be understood,
where irreligious knowledge stands the risk of exercising improper influence.

16
17

18
19
20

De Been "Quest for Neutrality" 183. Also see Vischer Conscience and the Common Good 103.
Schoeman Ideology, Culture, and Education 146. Moral perspectives cannot be avoided. The
very selection of curriculum materials (implicitly or explicitly) imports concepts of the moral
nature of culture and society. What is deemed important and essential to know has strong moral
dimensions, though these dimensions often fail to rise to the level of articulation.
Schoeman Ideology, Culture, and Education 147.
In this regard see McCarthy et al Society, State, and Schools 126-127.
Greenawalt 2002 JLP 336. Also see McGarry 1983 CL 7.
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Iain Benson comments:21
Just as it is an error to use 'faith' as a code word for religious faith because of our
various forms of 'faith', and to continue to speak in blanket fashion of 'unbelievers'
so it is an error to view a non-religious form of public education as one lacking
'faith' commitments.

Added to this is the erroneous understanding that "the public" is divorced from all
religious content. The term "public education" is popularly understood in liberal
societies in a manner that suggests that "religious education" is to be excluded from
the public, and that "public education" means "irreligious education". In the words of
Iain Benson, "A division between education called public and religious education also
implies, if it does not expressly state it, that a bright-line exists between something
we call the 'public' and something else, in this case education that is religious".22
This misconception of "the public", implying a sphere devoid of all religious
discourse, could lead to "secular intolerance", where the state sets out to cleanse
the public sphere from any actual reference to religious beliefs and practice.23 This
understanding that religion is a highly privatised matter poses the risk of creating an
understanding of proselytism that is restricted to religious expression only. As soon
as religion raises its head in the public domain, attempts are made at stifling it, lest
it would overstep its "private" boundaries and hinder the so-called neutral space of
the public. Consequently, irreligious forms of expression in the public domain (which
includes public schools) and their potentially manipulative proselytising influence
occur unchecked. This is also evident in the plethora of jurisprudence and case law
where proselytism is dealt with mainly under the banner of "the religious". Another
reason as to why "the irreligious" might seem foreign to proselytism is liberalism's
understanding, in the context of education, of the idea that faith and rational
reflection are mutually exclusive. This ignores the fact that no proof of anything can
be so completely drawn as to eliminate its dependence on undemonstrable givens.
When an individual relies on whatever constitutes his or her ultimate concern, this

21

22
23

Benson "Are Religious Schools Public Schools?" 6. Also see Benson 2000 UBCLR 541 and Benson
2010 JSR 22, 25.
Benson "Are Religious Schools Public Schools?" 1-2, 18-19, 26-27.
Martinez-Torrόn and Navarro-Valls 1998 HM 36. Also see Copley 2008 JREA 22.
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constitutes an act of faith.24 Therefore, where ultimate concerns rest on irreligious
beliefs, then such ultimate concerns also stand the risk of being used in a
manipulative manner. Therefore, in education the irreligious can also result in
improper proselytism.
This dialectic between the religious and the irreligious in education becomes more
fraught when the question of pupils' moral education is raised. In some courses,
texts and teachers adopt a "values clarification" approach to moral issues,
suggesting that pupils need to clarify and choose their values. Values clarification in
its usual form is diametrically opposed to the belief that moral standards derived
from religion are absolutely binding.25 When the religious view is excluded from the
entire curriculum, students may come to the conclusion that religion is somehow less
then acceptable or a private matter not to be discussed openly.26 In the context of
courses such as social studies, history, current events, literature, health, hygiene,
home economics and family living, typically a question is posed, diverse alternatives
are suggested and considered, and the problem is freely discussed.27 Arguments and
factors of various types – with the exception of religious considerations – are raised
and analysed, and both individual and group solutions are arrived at on an entirely
secular basis.28 This subtly provides an aggressive and intolerant approach towards
anything religious and allows other beliefs (irreligious) in its place. In a study of
textbooks in Missouri in America, for example, it was found that there are few
theistic references in textbook descriptions of present-day life and literature. In this
we find the inculcation of humanism (which represents a central belief system) by
elimination of theism.29 Needless to say, it is not only in Missouri where theistic
references in textbook descriptions are substantially limited. This also has

24
25

26
27
28

29

Budziszewski True Tolerance 130-131.
Greenawalt 2002 JLP 338. This emphasis on values also overlaps with humanism's emphasis on
cultural relativism, in other words the belief that values are grounded only in a given culture and
have no transcultural normativity. In this regard, see McCarthy et al Society, State, and Schools
128.
Wilson 2003 TRLP 424.
McGarry 1983 CL 5-6.
McCarthy et al Society, State, and Schools 127. For example, the fact that Martin Luther King
was a pastor and that the black churches played a key role are ignored in political events of
particular importance, such as the Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott of 1955-56.
McCarthy et al Society, State, and Schools 122. Also see McGarry 1983 CL 6.
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implications for how the irreligious dimension of improper proselytism should be
understood, where irreligious knowledge stands the risk of exercising improper
influence.
A central task of public schools in a democratic and plural dispensation is to transmit
and reproduce the specific cultural, religious and political traditions of the
communities they serve. A school that takes this task seriously, whilst simultaneously
adopting a posture of strict neutrality by means of any secular or religious
worldview, is oxymoronic.30 There is a problem in education in defining neutrality,
because making a neutral choice in education is making a choice.31 Neutrality, when
applied as a principle, holds that other principles (for example, those based on
religious convictions) may not be included or even accommodated. It is this kind of
purported "strict neutrality" which feeds a positivistic approach into school
education. The argument against a neutral education can be understood by
reference to Nagel's more general claim that liberal theory is non-neutral, because it
discounts conceptions that depend on interpersonal relations. Indeed, the family,
and particularly the parental bond, constitutes such relations, ignored by the call for
religiously neutral education.32 In fact, the "neutral" law will inevitably collide with
the moral obligations of individuals, especially in cases where the state assumes the
prerogative to organise the curricula of schools without considering the religious or
philosophical convictions of parents in the pursuit of supposed "neutrality".33 Against
the background of Lautsi and Others v Italy, where the ECtHR dealt with whether
crucifixes could be displayed in classrooms, Wouter De Been comments that:34
… a growing body of evidence … suggests that it is impossible to section off a
distinct category of artefacts that sends out a symbolic meaning from another set of
objects that does not. Our experience of the world is inescapably qualitative,
drenched in emotive and aesthetic meaning. Consequently, taking away the cross
will not result in an absence of symbols, but in a symbol of absence, a symbolic
absence of religion within a ring-fenced space created by a secular initiative.

30
31
32
33
34

De Been "Quest for Neutrality" 183.
Scolnicov, cited in Langlaude 2006 ICLQ 935.
Scolnicov 2007 IJCR 260.
Martinez-Torrόn and Navarro-Valls 1998 HM 32-33.
De Been "Quest for Neutrality" 182. Also see Copley 2008 JREA 31.
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The same applies to efforts in many liberal paradigms towards ridding public
education from anything religious. Having therefore looked at religion and belief in
teaching, its protection in human rights instruments, the understanding that religion
forms part of the public domain, as well as to how, for example, the teaching of
positivist values and calls for neutrality introduce a dominant irreligious influence in
the classroom, the relevance of improper proselytism to such irreligious teaching is
investigated next.
3

The irreligious as improper proselytism in teaching

The potential of improper proselytism finds special relevance in matters related to
the nature and parameters of the teaching at school of specific modules such as
history, literature, physics, biology, and life skills. In this regard, the overlap
between a predominantly irreligious education and "inappropriate", "coercive" or
"manipulative" forms of proselytism is investigated, and here the risk of improper
proselytism as the coercion of learners towards exclusively irreligious influences is
addressed. It is in this regard that positivism, the teaching of values and calls for
neutrality (referred to earlier) in education pose risks of improperly influencing
pupils. Scholarship on improper irreligious proselytism and, more specifically, the
improper influence of the teaching of irreligious knowledge at public schools have
received little attention in human rights scholarship.
For the purposes of this article an understanding similar to Ted Stahnke's
understanding of proselytism is applied, namely that proselytism is "expressive
conduct undertaken with the purpose of trying to change the religious beliefs,
affiliation, or identity of another".35 However, an important addition is suggested
here (and as mentioned earlier), namely that not only should proselytism be linked
to the changing of religious beliefs, but also of irreligious beliefs.36 This is also

35
36

Stahnke 1999 BYULR 255.
In Kokkinakis v Greece ECtHR No 14307/88, 25 May 1993, Judge Pettiti, in his partly concurring
opinion in this well-known proselytism case in the ECtHR, states that the reasoning of the
judgment could also have better reflected the fact that Article 9 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (referred to earlier) also applies to irreligious philosophical beliefs (author's
emphasis).

875

SA DE FREITAS

PER / PEJL 2014(17)3

supported by dictionary meanings ascribed to the term "proselytise".37 Proselytism
understood as a form of persuasive38 expression should include not only religious,
but also belief expressions.39 Why should "persuasive expression" be limited only to
religious beliefs and not non-religious beliefs as well?
In international human rights there is no definitive consensus about whether
proselytism is a manifestation of religion or belief and therefore encompassed within
the concept of the right to freedom of religion or belief.40 This lack of any direct
recognition of proselytism may be an indication of the sensitivity of states to the
issues it raises and the difficulty of delineating agreeable standards.41 Prohibitions on
proselytism have been enacted regarding the exertion of influence on people whose
capacities or circumstances render them vulnerable. This is understood as a form of

improper manipulation.42 It is interesting to note that this form of manipulation
applies almost solely to the conversion of religious beliefs. The manipulation of other
ideas and beliefs in similar circumstances (ranging from political persuasion to the

37

38
39

40
41

42

Stevenson Oxford Dictionary 1427: "Convert or attempt to convert someone from one religion,
belief, or opinion to another"; Simpson and Weine Oxford English Dictionary 664: "to cause to
come over or turn from one opinion, belief, creed, or party to another".
Garnett 2005 USTLJ 457.
Uzzell 2004 http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-122989524/don-t-call-it-proselytism. It is
interesting to note that the term proselytism had a meaning beyond that of the religious during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For example, Edmund Burke in 1790 applied it to the
anti-Christian philosophes of the French Enlightenment.
Stahnke 1999 BYULR 275.
Stahnke 1999 BYULR 275: However, here it is important to note that the essence of the
"freedom of religion", as defined by the Supreme Court of Canada in its first case about religion,
namely R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd 1985 CANLII 69, [1985] 1 SCR 295 (Canada), is that the right
not only encompasses the right to hold a belief in private, but inter alia the right to "manifest",
"teach" and "disseminate" it. Thus, these things cannot really be offences against others as long
as they do not spill over into "coercion".
Referring to the ECtHR's view in the Larissis v Greece ECtHR No 140/1996/759/958-960, 24
February 1998 judgement, Stijn Smet states that: "… if the addressee finds herself in a
particularly vulnerable relationship towards the proselytiser, who in turn stands in a position of
authority or power vis-à-vis the addressee, measures may be taken to protect the latter's
autonomy, provided it is effectively impaired. However, if the proselytism does not impair the
addressee's autonomy, the conflict is decided in favour of the proselytiser" (Stijn "Freedom of
Religion v Freedom from Religion" 119). The manipulation of the addressee or the exertion of an
improper influence of a belief (whether religious or non-religious) on an addressee can also be
linked to practices where a specific belief is conveyed to the recipient or addressee (who is in a
vulnerable position), thereby excluding any other belief that might be of fundamental importance
to that recipient. This in turn has the potential to result in an improper form of proselytism
towards the recipient. Where the proselytiser is in a position of influence and authority and the
addressee is vulnerable, then the withholding of valuable information can constitute a form of
manipulation. This is of special relevance to the relationship between teacher and pupil.
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inducement to purchase products by means including advertising) generally remains
legal and even desirable in a society predicated on a free marketplace of ideas. This
distinction between the change of religious beliefs and change of any other belief
lacks any coherent justification,43 though it may be said that it does support
arguments about the dominance of coercive fundamentally anti-religious irreligious
understandings.
The wider understanding of the protection and limitation of religious belief, which is
reflected in regional human rights instruments and in the constitutions of many
democratic and plural countries, understands such protection and limitation to
include irreligious beliefs as well.44 Therefore, when we talk of freedom of religion
and freedom from improper religious influence, then this also includes freedom of
irreligious beliefs and freedom from improper influence by irreligious beliefs.
Preventing the "proselytiser" from expressing her religious or irreligious beliefs may
violate her freedom to manifest her belief, whilst the recipient or addressee may
argue that the "proselytiser" may not improperly interfere with her freedom to hold a
religious or irreligious belief.
Fortunately, the ECtHR has taken a wide or inclusive approach to the definition of
religion. According to the ECtHR, religion includes claims concerning scientology,
druidism, pacifism, communism, atheism, pro-life, Divine Light Zentrum, and the
Moon Sect.45 The ECtHR case law tends to revolve around the definition of "belief"
rather than that of "religion", and the term "belief" is considered in its jurisprudence
to require a worldview rather than a mere opinion.46 An understanding of "religion"
as including both belief and disbelief of a certain type makes the notion broad
enough to include even the religiously "neutral" values inculcated at state schools. In
this regard, there is a sound basis for the objections of those arguing that irreligious

43
44

45
46

Scolnicov Right to Religious Freedom 199-200.
See for example, the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) Article 9; the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 section 15; the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
1982 section 2; the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights (1981) Article 8; the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Article 18; the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981).
Hill "Bracelets, Rings and Veils" 310-311.
Hill "Bracelets, Rings and Veils" 311.
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schools are not neutral with respect to religion; they implicitly endorse one type of
religion (which is humanism) to the exclusion of others. In doing this, they violate
the freedom of thought of pupils who are educated at public schools.47
One of the pioneers of educational psychology, John Dewey, explained that the
morals of pupils are influenced by the school's curriculum, which is the moral
environment found at all schools, conveyed by the school rules, the moral
orientation of school staff, and text materials.48 Courts appear to have accepted that
teachers exert an influence over pupils not only through the advice or through
instruction they give but also by the example set. As the Canadian Supreme Court
observed in Ross v New Brunswick School District No 15, "[t]eachers occupy
positions of trust and confidence, and exert considerable influence over their
students as a result of their position".49 The Court quotes Canadian legal academic
Allison Reyes:50
Teachers are a significant part of the unofficial curriculum because of their
status as 'medium'. In a very significant way, the transmission of prescribed
'messages' (values, beliefs, knowledge) depends on the fitness of the
'medium' (the teacher).
Alison Mawhinney states that the susceptibility of children to a pervasive message
presented in an uncritical manner is a fact recognised by the ECtHR, which has
consistently drawn attention to the impressionable age of children.51 Bearing this in
mind, there can be no reason why the teaching of knowledge by a teacher to pupils
cannot meet the requirements for improper proselytism, where the "attributes of the
source and the target"52 are such that the target may not be able to exercise free
choice in accepting or resisting the change in beliefs emanating from the source.53

47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Clarke 1986 ICLQ 299.
Santrock Educational Psychology 100.
Lenta 2009 SALJ 853.
Lenta 2009 SALJ 853.
Mawhinney "Crucifixes, Classrooms and Children" 107.
For more on these requirements see Stahnke 1999 BYULR 327-330.
Stahnke comments that it is a basic assumption that a person should be able to make a
considered and unrestrained choice in matters of religious belief and affiliation. Therefore, the
more proselytism interferes with that ability to choose freely, the more the regulatory power of
the state may be attracted, Stahnke 1999 BYULR 327.
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Roland Pierik proposes that, in the context of school education, there should be an
evaluation as to the extent to which the curriculum is conveyed in an objective,
critical and plural manner and in an atmosphere free of proselytism. This requires an
assessment of the way in which the curriculum is drafted, and whether certain
elements give rise to a reasonable doubt regarding whether or not the curriculum is
violating the requirements of objectivity and pluralism.54 In addition, it was stated in
a judgement by the ECtHR, namely that of Folgerø and Others v Norway that:55
… the competent authorities have a duty to take the utmost care to see to it that
parents' religious and philosophical convictions are not disregarded at this level by
carelessness, lack of judgement or misplaced proselytism.

Until recently, according to Mawhinney, the requirement for conveying religious or
philosophical knowledge in an "objective, critical and plural manner" and the
prohibition on the aim of indoctrination constituted the two core principles applied in
cases arising under Article 2 of Protocol I56 of the European Convention of Human

Rights. However, with the 2006 ECtHR decision in Sefika Köse v Turkey,57 an
additional standard was added, namely the requirement of the State to maintain an
atmosphere free of any proselytism at schools.58 Mawhinney comments that,
arguably, in the Zengin case, the ECtHR could have relied solely on the "objective,
critical and plural" standard to reach its conclusion, but it chose instead to restate
the Köse norm, which places a duty on States to ensure that proselytism does not
take place at schools.59 The ECtHR has warned schools that they have to be alert to
circumstances under which teachers might use their influence over students as an
occasion for improper proselytism.60

54
55
56

57
58

59
60

Pierik "State Neutrality" 207.
Temperman "Religious Symbols" 164.
"No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it
assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to
ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religions and philosophical
convictions."
Sefika Köse v Turkey ECtHR No 26625/02, 24 January 2006.
Mawhinney "Crucifixes, Classrooms and Children" 97. This requirement on the state to maintain
an environment free from proselytism is seen again in the 2007 case of Zengin v Turkey ECtHR
No 1448/04, 9 October 2007 98.
Mawhinney "Crucifixes, Classrooms and Children" 99.
Evans 2008 HRLR 464.
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The source in the teaching environment has an "intellectual influence" over the
target, namely the pupil.61 The primary concern with the attributes of the proselytism
target relates to the perceived susceptibility of the target to the types of persuasion
that may be employed by the source. The greater the perceived vulnerability of the
target, the more likely that proselytism directed to it will be restricted. Children, for
example, may be susceptible to a change in religious beliefs.62 Other factors are also
used to determine whether there is a form of improper proselytism, for example, the
"nature of the place" where the proselytism takes place, as well as the "nature of
the action" of proselytism.63 Schools, for example, can be places where the persons
are required to be present for the most part.64 Stated otherwise, schools are places
where people are present by force of law – "where the listeners are a captive
audience".65 What should also be kept in mind is the authority carried by textbooks,
which are not only read, but are reviewed, discussed and digested.66 This gives
textbooks also a position of authority and consequent influence.
From the above it is evident that there should be a more inclusive understanding of
proselytism, which includes irreligious forms of improper influence as well. The
ECtHR has emphasised not only the protection of religious beliefs, but also that of
irreligious beliefs. The ECtHR has also made a point of referring to proselytism and
has expressed the importance of States having to maintain an atmosphere at
schools that is free of any improper proselytism, as argued in the above. The
relationship between teacher and pupil provides much potential for the practising of
irreligious improper proselytism, also bearing in mind that the irreligious, or the
absence of the religious, has the potential for influencing improperly.

61
62
63
64
65

66

See for example, Lerner 1998 EILR 515.
Stahnke 1999 BYULR 332.
See Stahnke 1999 BYULR 334-338.
Stahnke 1999 BYULR 334.
Lerner 1998 EILR 486. Althusser comments that: "Children from every conceivable class in
society spend most of their most 'vulnerable' childhood years at school. Here … a certain amount
of 'know-how' wrapped in … 'simply the ruling ideology in its pure state (ethics, civic instruction,
philosophy)' is literally drummed into them … and … 'no other ideological State apparatus has
the obligatory (and, not the least, free) audience of the totality of the children … eight hours a
day for five or six days out of seven" (Schoeman Ideology, Culture, and Education 143).
McCarthy et al Society, State, and Schools 123.
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Conclusion

As complex and diverse as the concept of proselytism may be, there is a popular
understanding that it relates only to improper or manipulative religious forms of
influence. The privatisation of religion in many democratic and plural societies
around the world today has almost provided a paranoid sensitivity towards religion
expressing itself in the public domain. This has contributed to the view that it is only
improper religious belief expressions that are related to forms of improper
proselytism, hereby not realising that irreligious belief expressions can also be
manipulative or improper towards the recipient or the addressee, thereby
constituting improper proselytism. Improper proselytism not only pertains to
religious forms of improper influence, but also to irreligious forms of improper
influence, including the preclusion of appropriate access (by religions) to the public
sphere. Within the public domain, one finds both religious and irreligious beliefs and
therefore there are communicative activities within the public sphere that include
expressions of both religious and irreligious belief that run the risk of being
manipulative or improper.
The argument here is that proselytism has to do as much with a religious action as
with an irreligious action. Where the expression of belief, whether religious or
irreligious, amounts to any form of manipulative or undue influence, improper
proselytism is applicable. To understand proselytism in this manner places all beliefs,
whether religious or irreligious, on an equal footing with one another. Improper
religious forms of expression should be no more suspect than improper irreligious
forms of expression, with both versions having the potential for giving rise to
improper proselytism. By critically looking at education and teaching in public
institutions it becomes clear that irreligious forms of influence run the risk (as do
religious forms of influence) of being improper or manipulative, thereby qualifying
improper irreligious belief influences as part of improper proselytism. Viewed in the
way I have argued in the above, the popular notion of improper proselytism as being
exclusively linked to religious forms of influence is dismantled and coercive
viewpoints of either religious or non/anti-religious perspectives are seen for the
improper coercive frameworks they could be.
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